INTRODUCTION
We consider an infinitely repeated game that is perturbed in the sense of Ž . Harsanyi 1973 ; i.e., payoff functions vary randomly around a mean that Ž . defines the unperturbed or classical game, and adapti¨e in that players' actions are governed by experience. Following Fudenberg and Kreps Ž . 1993 , we postulate that long-term behavior evolves according to fictitious play: At each game, each player knows her own payoff function for the Ž . next game, and chooses an action pure strategy calculated to optimize her payoff under the assumption that other players use the mixed strate-gies given by the empirical frequencies of past actions. In this article we present a mathematical framework for investigating such games for arbitrary finite numbers of players and actions. Applications are made to specific games and general theory.
Background. Fictitious play was introduced many years ago as an w Ž .x iterative method of solving an iterated unperturbed game Brown 1951 . w Ž . Convergence was proved for 2 = 2 games Robinson 1951 , Miyasawa Ž . Ž .x Ž 1961 , and Metrick and Polak 1994 , and for n = m games n players, m . w actions each in which players have identical payoff functions Monderer Ž .x Ž . and Shapley 1996 ; but Shapley 1964 exhibited 2 = 3 games without Ž . convergence. Cowan 1992 rigorously demonstrated chaotic behavior in 2 = 4 games.
Fictitious play has been examined as a learning rule for perturbed games w Ž . Ž . Fudenberg and Kreps 1993 , Kaniovski and Young 1995 , Benaım and Ž . Ž .x Hirsch 1994 , and Fudenberg and Levine 1995 , 1998 . Books on adaptive Ž . games from a variety of perspectives include Weibull 1995 , Vega-Ž . Ž . Ž . Redondo 1996 , Samuelson 1997 , Young 1998 , Fudenberg and Levine Ž . Ž . 1998 , and Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998 ; see also the special issue of w Ž .x Games and Economic Beha¨ior Sigmund and Young 1995 .
From now on we assume given an adaptive perturbed game in which players use fictitious play to choose their actions.
Let a denote the kth action profile, a vector listing the actions played k in game k. The kth state¨ector x lists the empirical frequencies of each k player's actions in the first k games. In fictitious play, the conditional probability distributions of a and x are functions of x and the kq 1 kq1 k random payoff function for game k q 1. These vectors form two stochastic Ä 4 Ä 4 processes: the action sequence a and the state sequence x . The latter is k k a Markov process with countably many states, essentially a generalized urn w Ž .x process Arthur et al. 1987 . Our results concern the probable behavior of state sequences, especially the location and shape of their limit sets, and the long-term averages of functions of action profiles, such as correlations of actions.
The following results are known for fictitious play for 2 = 2 games: If Ž . the unperturbed game has a unique Nash equilibrium possibly mixed , w then almost surely the state sequence converges to it Fudenberg and Ž .x Kreps 1993 . Under generic conditions, when the payoffs are subject to a certain types of sufficiently small independent random perturbations, the state sequence converges almost surely to an equilibrium of the perturbed game which is close to a Nash equilibrium e of the unperturbed game; and w e is a pure equilibrium of the unperturbed game, if any exists Kaniovski Ž . Ž .x and Hirsch 1994 . Up to now very little has been known, beyond these convergence theorems, about fictitious play for perturbed games with more than two players. A basic mathematical task is to devise methods for distinguishing between convergence and nonconvergence. Where convergence is certain in games with multiple equilibria, it is a challenging problem to estimate the probability distribution of the limiting equilibria. Where convergence is not certain, knowledge of the probable location and form of limit sets of sample paths is desirable.
Ä 4
New Results. Our main tool for investigating the Markov process x is k the dynamical system generated by the deterministic game¨ector field F in the compact convex polyhedron S comprising all possible state vectors:
Ž . F x points in the direction of the conditional expected change in the state w Ž . Ž . Ž .x vector, given that the current state is x Eqs. 16 , 17 , 18 . Equilibria Ž . zeroes of F are Nash distribution equilibria of the perturbed game Ž . Definition 1.3 , and solution curves to the game differential equation Ž . Ä 4 dxrdt s F x may be viewed as caricatures of state sequences x . Our k fundamental result, the limit set theorem 3.3, characterizes limit sets of sample paths in terms of the dynamical system ⌽ generated by F. Special properties of ⌽ for various classes of games, derived from results in dynamical systems theory, lead to conclusions about probable behavior of state sequences.
For a broad class of 2 = 2 games, including those with countably many Nash distribution equilibria, we prove almost sure convergence of the state Ž . sequence Theorem 2.2 ; this extends the results of Fudenberg and Kreps Ž . Ž . 1993 for unique equilibrium games, and Kaniovski and Young 1995 for small noise. Further convergence theorems are obtained for several classes Ž of n = 2 coordination and anticoordination games Theorems 6.10 and .
.
There is, however, no reason to expect convergence in general: For broad parameter ranges and not too much noise, nonconvergence is almost certain in an adaptive perturbed version of the 3-player matching game of Ž . Jordan 1993 , even though there is a unique Nash distribution equilibrium Ž . Theorem 6.9 .
For fictitious play in general perturbed games, under mild restrictions there is positive probability that the limit set of the state sequence lies in Ž . any given attractor of the flow of F Theorem 5.4 . In particular, every asymptotically stable equilibrium has positive probability of being selected. On the other hand, there is zero probability of convergence to a linearly Ž . unstable equilibrium Theorem 5.1 . If x ª x# with positive probability, k and the noise is diffuse near x#, then almost surely all action Ž profilesᎏeven highly inefficient onesᎏare played infinitely often Prop-. osition 5.6 . Theorem 4.1 gives information on long-term averages of functions of action profiles.
Outline of Contents. Section 1 gives the basic mathematical setup of perturbed games, fictitious play, Markov processes and the game vector field. Convergence theorems for 2 = 2 games are stated in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes dynamics of the game vector field and presents the limit set theorem. In Section 4 convergence for 2 = 2 games is proved, and also a result on limit sets of cumulative averages of general functions of action profiles. Section 5 contains results on equilibrium selection and action sequences for games with arbitrary numbers of players and pure strategies. In Section 6 we prove results on convergence and nonconvergence in n = 2 coordination and anticoordination games, and constraints on sample paths are obtained.
GAMES WITH RANDOMLY PERTURBED PAYOFFS
In this section we introduce the adaptive model considered by Fuden-Ž . berg and Kreps 1993 in which players determine pure by privately observed noisy payoffs, in the spirit of Harsanyi's 1973 purification theorem. Ä 4 We denote the set 0, 1, 2, . . . of natural numbers by N, the set of positive natural numbers by N , and the Euclidean norm of z g R n by
The basic model is an infinitely repeated game played by g N q Ä 4 players labeled by i g 1, . . . , at times k s 1, 2 . . . . It is convenient to use superscript yi to refer to the set of players / i. Thus in a game with two players, yi refers to the opponent of player i. i Ä 4 We assume that player i has a fixed, finite action set A s 1, 2, . . . , d .
i
The Cartesian product of the other players' action sets is denoted by 
We identify S i with the set of probability measures on A 
strategies for player i's opponents. The game's state space is the compact convex polyhedron, 
where each E i is a matrix-valued random variable with zero mean. There is no assumption here that E i and E j are independent for i / j. We refer to this as a perturbed game.
When playing the game, each player knows only her own payoff matrix. Ž . Properly speaking, the data 1 specify not a single game but a random game.
Suppose r g S yi lists a set of mixed strategies for player i's opponents. An action l g A i is called a best response of player i to r if it maximizes the expected payoff to player i, assuming that she plays l and her opponents plays r. Thus
To ensure uniqueness of the best response, we assume from now on that the random variables U i satisfy the following ad hoc condition: 
yi w x U l, z for some l / m has zero Lebesgue measure. Therefore Hypothesis 1.1 is easily seen to be valid for a large class of random matrices.
The best response map of player i is the deterministic map
the probability that action l is the best response of player i when the yi Ä 4 opponent uses the mixed strategy s . Thus for each l g 1, . . . , d :
It is easy to see that ␤ i is at least as smooth as the random variable E i .
DEFINITION 1.2. The Nash map
: S ª S is defined by
Ž .
To a joint mixed strategy s, the Nash map assigns the list comprising each player's best response to the opponents' strategies listed in s. Notice that is Lipschitz, C r or analytic provided the probability distribution functions of the matrices E i have the corresponding property. DEFINITION 1.3. A Nash distribution equilibrium of the augmented game is a fixed point s# g S of the Nash map. Remark 1.4. If is continuous, the existence of Nash distribution equilibria follows from the Brouwer fixed point theorem. But the calculation of these equilibria by the players would require that the marginal probability laws of the random payoffs U i are common knowledge. In this situation a Nash distribution equilibrium is the probability distribution of a w Ž . Nash equilibrium for the augmented game Harsanyi 1973 and Fuden-Ž .x berg and Kreps 1993 . Although we do not assume players have this knowledge, we show that in many cases the adaptive process of fictitious play causes empirical frequencies to converge to some Nash distribution equilibrium.
The set of probability measures on the finite set A is denoted by P P A : it is naturally identified with the simplex ⌬ dy1 ; R d . Closely related to the Nash map is the joint best response map
The number s gives the probability that a g A constitutes the joint a Ä i 4 best responses to the mixed strategy profile s g S. When the matrices E are independent,
Fictitious Play and the Game Vector Field
We consider the state space,
Ž .
Ž . space at every point is identified with the linear subspace
A¨ector field on S is a map from S to TS. The empirical frequency¨ector of player i after the first k games is
The mth component of x i is the proportion of times in the first k games 
Note the recursion
the state sequence of the infinitely repeated game.
The empirical joint frequency tensor at time k is the map C : A ª R k which assigns to an action profile the frequency with which it was played in the first k games. Formally,
where I denotes the indicator function of an action profile a g A. For a 2 = 2 games C is identified with a 2 = 2 matrix. i w Ž .x w Ž .x Using the best response maps ␤ Eq. 2 and the Nash map Eq. 3 we obtain the formulas,
Ž . From 13 and 14 we derive:
The game¨ector field F: S ª TS is defined as
Ž . Ž .
Ž . F x measures the extent to which x is not a Nash distribution equilibrium Ž . Ž . Ž . Definition 1.3 . Equations 14 and 15 give further meaning to F,
Ž . In other words: If the state at time k is x, then F x is k q 1 times the expected change in the state.
Our analysis of fictitious play relies on a close connection between limits Ä 4 of sample paths x , and the dynamics of the deterministic game differen-
In a similar way, we will analyze the empirical joint frequencies in terms of the dynamics of the system of differential
In the next section we give some interesting consequences of the general theory which can be easily stated without the full mathematical formalism of Section 3. We record for reference the obvious but useful fact alluded to above: PROPOSITION 1.5. The zeroes of the game¨ector field F are the Nash distribution equilibria.
ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR OF ADAPTIVE 2 = 2 PERTURBED GAMES
In this section we describe the asymptotic behavior of the state sequence for 2 = 2 games having arbitrarily many Nash distribution equilibria. Proofs are postponed to Sections 3 and 4. 
Con¨ergence of Empirical Frequencies
is given the inter¨al coordinates
In addition to Hypothesis 1.1, we further assume:
This technical assumption is crucial to our proofs, as it validates the standard theorems of existence, uniqueness, and continuity of solutions to differential equations. In some cases, as, for example, in classical fictitious play for games with fixed payoff matrices, it is not satisfied; but for many perturbed games it holds.
Ä 4 Given a state sequence x in I = I resulting from infinitely rek kg N peated fictitious playᎏthus a sample path of a stochastic process satisfying Ž . Ä 4 5 ᎏwe say that a point x# g I = I is a limit point of x if k kg N lim x s x# for some sequence k ª ϱ. The set of such limit points is iªϱ k i i Ä 4 Ä 4 the state limit set L x . Because the sequence x is a random variable, k k the state limit set is a set-valued random variable, that is, a function assigning a set to each element of a probability space. By extension of the usual probabilistic convention we refer to it as a set, just as a numerical random variable is treated as a number.
The following theorem extends Proposition 8.1 of Fudenberg and Kreps Ž . 1993 to arbitrary 2 = 2 games; it also generalizes a result of Kaniovski Ž . and Young 1995 for small noise. w Ž .x Recall that is the joint best response map Eq. 4 . Let E E ; I = Î denote the set of Nash distribution equilibria. Ä 4 a With probability 1, the limit set L x is a point or a compact arc in k E E that is the graph of a strictly increasing or decreasing function.
Ž . Ä 4 b If E E is finite or countably infinite then almost surely x con¨erges
k to a Nash distribution equilibrium.
This result shows that when there are only countably many Nash distribution equilibria, players behave in the long run as though they have Ž computed the equilibria of the game. Players who know the probability laws of the stochastic matrices U 1 and U 2 , and who read Remark 1.4, can . do that.
It is a generic condition for a vector field to have finite equilibrium set, 1 Ž . that is, it holds for a dense open set of C continuously differentiable Ž . Ž . vector fields on any compact manifold. In this sense, b and c imply that for most games of the type considered, sequences of sample paths and joint frequency matrices converge almost surely. The following corollary of Ž . a gives an easily verified criterion for finiteness of equilibria, hence for convergence. The hypothesis holds, for example, if entries in the payoff Ž . matrices 11 are independent with analytic density functions: Remark 2.5. Our assumptions on the noise matrices in Theorem 2.2 and its corollaries are less restrictive than those of Fudenberg and Kreps Ž . 1993 , who require that the uncertainty in the payoff to a player depends w Ž .x only on that player's action Hypothesis 6.1 ii . Corollary 2.3 implies almost sure convergence of state sequences for noise matrices of this form having analytic probability distribution functions.
CONTINUOUS TIME DYNAMICS AND FICTITIOUS PLAY
This section introduces the mathematical basis for our analysis of Ž . Ž . adaptive perturbed games, in terms of game vector field F x s yx q x w Ž .x Eq. 16 and the corresponding game differential equation in S:
dt whose solution flow is denoted by ⌽.
In¨ariant Sets and Attractors
Throughout the remainder of this section we assume: HYPOTHESIS 3.1. The game¨ector field F is locally Lipschitz.
Next we introduce tools enabling us to analyze game asymptotics in terms of the dynamics of F. Denoting the dimension of S by
we identify S with a compact convex subset of R n having nonempty interior, and its tangent space TS with R n ; for convenience we assume the origin belongs to the interior of S. Under this identification, the game vector field is a Lipschitz map
It is convenient to extend F to a Lipschitz map defined on all of R n as Ž .
Ž Ž .. n follows: for x outside S, set F x s F x where : R ª S is the retraction along rays emanating from some point of S. This makes F: R n ª R n a bounded Lipschitz map. It follows that F is completely integrable, meaning that its trajectories are defined for all values of t. Therefore F generates a flow
Ž . where for each y g R , the function t ¬ ⌽ y is the solution to the initial
Ž . The parameterized curve t ¬ ⌽ y is the trajectory of y; the image of this t curve is the orbit of y.
For each fixed t g R, the map y ¬ ⌽ y is a homeomorphism of R n . We t Ä n n 4 view the flow as the collection of maps ⌽ : R ª R , with ⌽ t t g R 0 n Ž . denoting the identity map of R . Uniqueness of solutions to Eq. ?? implies the composition law ⌽ ( ⌽ s ⌽ .
Ž . An equilibrium or stationary point p is a zero of F; this is equivalent, Ž . by uniqueness of solutions, to ⌽ p s p for all t. A point y is periodic if t Ž . Ž ⌽ y s y for some T ) 0. The limit set more properly, the omega limit
Ž . set of x and of its orbit and trajectory is the set of points of the form Ž . lim ⌽ x for some sequence t ª ϱ.
holds for all t G 0. It can be shown that S is forward invariant, using Ž . w convexity of S and the fact that F x y x g S for all S see Definition 1.2 Ž .x and Eq. 16 . Equilibria, periodic orbits, and omega limit sets are also invariant. < ⌽ Q denotes the restriction of ⌽ to an invariant set Q, that is, the < collection of maps ⌽ Q: Q ª Q. When Q is forward invariant but not t < invariant, by a slight abuse of language ⌽ Q denotes the semiflow We call Q attractor-free if Q is a nonempty compact invariant set and < there is no proper attractor for ⌽ Q. Many types of compact invariant sets are known to be attractor-free, such as periodic orbits, omega limit sets, and supports of ergodic invariant Borel measures.
The interplay between attractors and attractor-free sets is very helpful in analyzing long-term dynamical behavior. The following simple but useful result says that an attractor-free compact invariant set is contained in every attractor whose basin it meets: LEMMA 3.2. Let Q be forward in¨ariant for a flow ⌽, let ⌳ ; Q be < compact and in¨ariant, and assume ⌽ ⌳ is attractor-free. Suppose K ; Q is < an attractor for ⌽ Q and the basin B of K meets ⌳. Then K > ⌳.
Proof. ⌳ l K is nonempty: Given x g ⌳ l B, there is a sequence t ª ϱ such that ⌽ x converges, necessarily to a point in ⌳ l K. It is now k t k < easy to see that ⌳ l K is an attractor for ⌽ ⌳. Therefore ⌳, being attractor-free, coincides with ⌳ l K. QED
The Limit Set Theorem

Ä 4
The following theorem describes the state limit set L x in terms of the k dynamics of the game vector field F. COROLLARY 3.4. With probability 1, the state limit set is contained in e¨ery attractor whose basin it meets.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is based on the important recursion
where the random variable Z is defined by 22 : Benaım and Hirsch 1996 , concerningẗ he asymptotic behavior of stochastic approximation processes satisfying Lemma 3.5. QED
APPLICATIONS OF THE LIMIT SET THEOREM
Correlated Strategies
The limit set theorem 3.3 characterizes limit sets of the vector of empirical frequencies of players' actions. Here we consider limit sets of long run averages of an arbitrary deterministic function evaluated on the sequence of action profiles. In particular, we estimate the location of the Ä 4 limit set of the sequence C of joint frequency tensors. The kth empirical frequency vector of the process is the random vector
Ž . The following result uses the machinery of the limit set theorem to w x estimate the location of L H in terms of the deterministic function H giving the expected value of H after the next play, conditioned on the current state,
x where x is the value at a g A of the joint best response map Eq. 4 . that the process
Ž . is a stochastic approximation process 22 whose corresponding ordinary differential equation in R n = R m is given by the system,
where F denotes the game vector field. Notice that the evolution of x t is independent of u. 
.Ž . Ž . where the last equality holds because H x g C; here dist y, C is the distance from y to the nearest point of C. Thus
F ydist u, C .
Ž .
t Now V is a continuous convex function because C is convex, so V admits a right partial derivative with respect to u. Therefore, letting t go to zero in the last inequality gives Proof. Here n s 2. As usual we identify the state space with I = I. If the game vector field Proof of Theorem 2.2. We first prove that the limit set ⌳ of a state y1 Ž . sequence is almost surely a compact connected subset of E E s F 0 ; S, the set of Nash distribution equilibria. By Theorem 3.3, ⌳ is almost surely Ä 4 a compact, connected attractor-free invariant set. Let ␦ g 0, 1, 2 denote w Ž .x the topological dimension of ⌳ Hurewicz and Wallman 1948 . If d s 0 Ž then ⌳, being connected, is a singleton because a zero-dimensional set is . totally disconnected , so ⌳ is an equilibrium by invariance. If ␦ s 2, the interior of ⌳ is nonempty, contradicting Corollary 4.3, so this is impossible.
Ž . If ␦ s 1 we use a result of Hirsch and Pugh 1988 : Any one-dimensional attractor-free set for a planar flow that does not separate the plane, consists entirely of stationary points. Thus in all cases ⌳ ; E E.
Now E E is the intersection of the graphs of x s ␤ x and x s ␤ x Ž . by Eq. 24 . Therefore each compact connected subset of E E maps injectively into I under each of the two coordinate projections I = I ª I. It follows that every connected subset of E E is either a point or a compact Ž . Ž . Ž . arc. This proves a and b of Theorem 2.2. Assertion c follows Theorem Ž .
b . QED
Proof of Corollary 4.3. Let : R 2 ª I = I be a real analytic extensioñ Ž . the Nash map Definition 1.2 . Then E E is the fixed point set of , so E E is ã compact analytic variety. The preceding proof shows that every connected component of E E is either a point or a compact arc. As a compact analytic variety has a finite number of connected components, and none of them can be an arc, E E is finite. QED
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION AND LOCAL STABILITY
We consider an adaptive perturbed game with any number of players and arbitrary finite action sets. Even if we know that state sequences converge almost surely, it is not obvious which equilibrium is selected. Here we address this important question of equilibrium selection and the related problem of path dependence.
We 
Noncon¨ergence to Unstable Equilibria
Let x g S be a game state for an adaptive perturbed game with any number of players. The game is diffuse at x if whenever the game state is x, every action profile a has a positive probability of being selected at the Ž . next play:
The following theorem shows that unstable equilibria of the game vector field are eliminated as outcomes of diffuse adaptive perturbed games with C 2 game vector fields: This exhibits x# as a convex combination of all the extreme points a of S with strictly positive coefficients. Considering S as a convex body in R n , we have proved that the diffuse equilibrium x# is in the interior of S.
Ž . We use this to verify Pemantle's hypothesis 25 . The function of x g S defined as
is independent of k and continuous in x. It therefore suffices to show: Ž . x s x#. The conclusion of Theorem 5.1 holds provided V x# is nondek generate; the proof is essentially the same.
Positi¨e Probability of E¨ery Attractor
The following theorem implies that for a diffuse adaptive perturbed game admitting several asymptotically stable equilibria, even if a particular equilibrium is more efficient than the others, at every stage there is positive probability that the state sequence converges toward a less efficient equilibrium. In particular, if x# denotes any asymptotically stable equilibrium,
Proof. For asymptotically stable equilibria, the proof is a consequence of a well-known general result for urn processes that exploits the countw Ž . ability of the state space Arthur et al. 1987 and Benaım and Hirscḧ Ž .x w Ž . x 1995 . For general attractors this is proven in Benaım 1999 , Sect. 7 . QED Ž . Theorem 5.4 can be compared to a result of Arthur et al. 1988 : if B is a connected component of the equilibrium set having nonempty interior, then even for discontinuous F, there is positive probability that Ž . lim dist x , B s 0; note that B is not assumed to be an attractor.
The following consequence of Theorems 5.1 and 5.4 completely characterizes the long run qualitative behavior of fictitious play for a generic class of 2 = 2 games: COROLLARY 5.5. Consider a 2 = 2 adapti¨e perturbed game satisfying Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2, with all Nash distribution equilibria simple. Then:
Ä 4 i The sequence x of empirical frequency¨ectors con¨erges with k probability 1 to a Nash distribution equilibrium.
Ž .
ii Let x# be a linearly unstable equilibrium such that the Nash map is 
Paths to Equilibrium
The following result gives a further restriction on action sequences in diffuse games. It implies that even for convergence to a clearly optimal equilibrium, the players occasionally, but infinitely often, play the worst possible actions. Ä PROPOSITION 5.6. Let x# denote a diffuse equilibrium with P lim x k ªϱ k 4 s x# ) 0. Then the conditional probability that e¨ery action profile a g A is played infinitely often, gi¨en that x ª x#, is 1.
Proof. Let x# s c ) 0. Let F F denote the sigma field generated a , a , . . . , a . By the generalized Borel᎐Cantelli lemma Doob 1953 , .x p. 324 , the following two sets of events coincide except for a set of measure zero:
Ä 4
a s a infinitely often ,
where the last inclusion holds because ⌶ x , a converges to c ) 0 on the n Ä 4 set of events x ª x# . Therefore, modulo sets of measure zero:
In this section we consider some adaptive perturbed games with more than two players. First we treat a version of Jordan's 3-player matching Ž game. For sufficiently concentrated noise e.g., low variance if the noise is . Gaussian , almost surely sample paths do not converge to the unique Nash distribution equilibrium, and for n s 3 they cluster at a periodic orbit of the game vector field. For sufficiently diffuse noise, on the other hand, sample paths almost surely converge. Later we describe n = 2 generalized coordination and anticoordination games, identify classes where convergence is guaranteed, and investigate the geometry of limit sets.
Ä 4 There are n G 2 players indexed modulo n by i g 1, . . . , n , each player Ž 1 . n w Ž .x having two pure strategies. The state space, formally ⌬ Eq. 6 , is n w x n Ž 1 n . conveniently identified with the n-cube I s 0, 1 , with p s p , . . . , p g I n denoting the state in which player i's empirical frequency of playing action 1 is p i . The game vector field is F: I n ª R n ; the set of Nash y1 Ž . n distribution equilibria is denoted by E E s F 0 ; I . The payoff function for player i is given by a 2 = 2 ny 1 matrix ii For each i, the random¨ariables y ha¨e a common k, 2 k, 1 i w x probability density function f : R ª 0, 1 that is smooth and strictly positi¨e.
Note that
i y i also has zero mean. We denote its probability
Zero mean and positivity of f i imply
Ž . Equation 31 below shows that the probabilities governing fictitious play are functions of K i . When the K i are analytic, we speak of analytic noise.
Noncon¨ergence in Jordan's Matching Game
Ž . Jordan 1993 exhibited a classical 3 = 2 matching game with a unique Nash equilibrium, for which fictitious play does not converge. We generalize this to n = 2 perturbed games and obtain broad parameter ranges guaranteeing convergence and nonconvergence.
Payoffs in the n = 2 unperturbed matching game as described in terms of the matrix
The payoff to player i g 1, . . . , n depends only on the actions of players i and i q 1, and is determined by the matrix V i s V: If they, respectively, Ä 4 i play k, l g 1, 2 , the payoff to i is V . Thus player i tries to match player k l i q 1. The payoff to player n, however, is determined by
player n tries not to match player 1.
Consider now the adaptive perturbed game with payoffs in game k determined as above by noisy 2 = 2 payoff matrices
subject to Hypothesis 6.1. In game k q 1 player i plays the pure strategy Ž that maximizes his expected payoff, under the assumption usually mis-. taken that player i q 1 plays the mixed strategy given by empirical frequency vector x iq1 . Thus the probability, conditioned on x iq1 , that k k player i plays strategy 1 in game k q 1, is the same as the conditional probability
The form of V and Hypothesis 6.1 imply:
We calculate the game vector field F in terms of the functions
Ž . Note that 0 -h -1. From Eqs. 29 and 31 :
The game differential equation is dp
While the state space for the extended game is I n , the game vector field F n Ž . Ž . is defined in all of R by 33 , 34 . It is easily seen that there is a global Žw x n . attractor in Int 0, 1 . LEMMA 6.2. There is a unique Nash distribution equilibrium p#, gi¨en by 
Because the h is strictly increasing, q# s is the unique solution to this Notice that this p# is also the unique Nash equilibrium of the unperturbed game. The next two theorems illustrate how the noise densities f i influence Ä 4 the game dynamics and the state limit set L x :
i There is zero probability that lim x s p#.
ii Assume n G 3 is odd and the noise is analytic. Then the game w x n ector field has an attracting nonequilibrium periodic orbit ⌫ g 0, 1 , and Ä 4 L x s ⌫ with positi¨e probability. s G y ' yy q 1 y h y .
dt
Ž . This system is totally competitive and irreducible. Inequality 35 implies Ž . Ž . that DF p# , and hence DG p# , has one negative eigenvalue and two complex eigenvalues with positive real parts. Moreover, the negative eigenvalue has an eigenvector with all components positive, while the invariant linear subspace corresponding to the other eigenvalues is transw verse to all positive vectors. These are well-known implications of the Ž .x Perron᎐Frobenius theorem applied to yDF p# .
A fundamental property of totally competitive irreducible systems in R n having a global attractor, is the existence of a globally attracting, unw Ž . ordered invariant surface ⌺ Theorems 1.1 and 1.7 of Hirsch 1988a ; see Ž . Ž .x 1 w also Takac 1990 and Hirsch 1989 . Any such surface is C TerescaḱˇˇˇŽ .x 1 ny1 n 1994 and can be proven to be the graph of a C map R ª R with negative partial derivatives. In the present context, this shows that the two-dimensional unstable manifold of x# is a neighborhood of x# in ⌺. Therefore x# is a repellor for the flow in ⌺.
All compact invariant sets lie in the global attractor, hence in ⌺. Therefore the Poincare᎐Bendixson theory of planar flows implies that Ž Ä 4 . every connected attractor-free set e.g., L x by the limit set theorem is k either a periodic orbit or a set of equilibria.
Real analyticity of F can be used to show that the nonstationary periodic orbits ⌫ are finite in number, by an implicit function theorem For n s 3, Theorem 6.3 precludes convergence when the densities f Ž . Therefore there must be a third eigenvector w of D⌽ q such that w, T Ž . F q , and¨are linearly independent. Because q lies in the invariant < surface S, and ⌽ S is a diffeomorphism, the tangent plane T S to S at q T q Ž . Ž .< is mapped isomorphically to itself by D⌽ q . Since D⌽ q T S has the T T q Ž . real eigenvector F q , it has a second real eigenvector; as¨is transverse to T , it follows that w is tangent to ⌺ at q. 
Ž .
T Ž < .Ž . Thus the two eigenvalues for D ⌽ S q are 1 and , 0 --1. This T < makes ⌳ an attractor for ⌽ ⌺, leading to the desired contradiction. This Ž . proves 37 .
Ä 4 w x 3 It follows that p# is a global attractor for the flow in 0, 1 . Therefore almost surely sample paths converge to p#, by the limit set theorem 3.3. QED
Coordination and Anticoordination Games
We now consider a broad class of n = 2 games whose game vector fields turn out to have very convenient dynamical properties. For general n we show that for many coordination games there is at least a positive probability of convergence, while for n s 3 it is certain. This contrasts with Jordan's matching game discussed above, which is an anticoordination game having no chance of convergence in certain parameter regimes.
We keep the notation of Section 1, assuming additionally that each player has exactly two pure strategies.
A classical 2 = 2 game with payoff matrices V i is sometimes informally termed a ''coordination game'' if the diagonal entries of V i dominate columns, i.e.,
because players do better if they both play the same action rather than different actions. We call it a generalized coordination game if each payoff matrix has the weaker property that the sum of the diagonal entries is not less than the sum of the off-diagonal entries, that is,
When the opposite weak inequality holds for both matrices, the game is a generalized anticoordination game. We use the term strict if the defining inequalities are strict. An example of a 2 = 2 generalized strict coordination game is given by
There is a unique Nash equilibrium: It is clearly optimal for player 1 to play action 2 and player 2 to play action 1. Thus the players do not necessarily ''coordinate'' their actions. Remark 6.7 below gives a sense in which action choices tend to reinforce each other under fictitious play. Ž . Consider an n = 2 game ⌫. To each ordered pair i, j of distinct Ä 4 n players and each action profile a g A s 1, 2 there corresponds a partial i j Ž . 2 = 2 game ⌫ a obtained by freezing the actions of other players. The i j Ž . first player of ⌫ a is player i of ⌫ and the second player is j; we informally denote these players as i and j for convenience. For any action Ž 1 2 . profile b s b , b of the partial game, player i receives the same payoff he receives in ⌫ when i, j play b 1 , b 2 , respectively, and each other player Ä 4 r Ž . i j Ž . r f i, j plays a the r th coordinate of a ; the payoff to j in ⌫ a is defined similarly. Ž An n = 2 game ⌫ is a generalized coordination respecti¨ely, anticoordi-. i j Ž . nation game if each partial 2 = 2 game ⌫ a has the corresponding Ä 4 property. Such a game is irreducible if for every i / j in 1, . . . , n there exists m G 1 and a sequence i , . . . , i such that:
and the partial 2 = 2 games for players i and i are strict for r s r r q1 0, . . . , m y 1. We apply these definitions to an adaptive perturbed game to mean that the unperturbed game has the corresponding form. These definitions depend on the labeling of the actions. It is sometimes possible to transform a given game into a generalized coordination or anticoordination game by relabeling actions. Jordan's matching game, for instance, can be transformed into a generalized anticoordination game, provided the number of players is odd.
The next proposition gives conditions on the game vector field F equivalent to generalized coordination and anticoordination. A vector field G in Euclidean space is cooperati¨e if its Jacobian matrices have nonnegative off-diagonal entries, i.e., Ѩ G rѨ x G 0 for i / j. When the off-diagonal Remark 6.7. This proposition suggests an interpretation for a general-Ž . ized coordination respectively, anticoordination game under fictitious play: At each round of play, player i's probability of playing action Ä 4 Ž . a g 1, 2 is a nondecreasing respectively, nonincreasing function of player j's empirical frequency of past plays of a, for j / i. Proof. F is a cooperative irreducible vector field by Proposition 6.6, and Ä 4 we may assume L x is connected, compact, and attractor-free by the k Ä 4 limit set theorem 3.3. This implies that either L x is an arc of equilibria, For analytic noise, F is an analytic map in R 3 . Therefore the equilibrium y1 Ž .
3 set F 0 is a compact, real analytic variety Z ; I . We will prove Z is zero dimensional and thus finite.
Any connected component X ; Z is unordered for the vector ordering 3 Ž . in R by Jiang 1991 . This implies X lies in an invariant surface ⌺ w Ž .x homeomorphic to the plane Hirsch 1988a ; therefore X has dimension at most 2. The space X, being an analytic variety, can be triangulated; its Ž . dimension is F 2 because it lies in a surface. If dim X s 1, it is known that every vertex must belong to at least two 1-simplices. Therefore X contains a simple closed curve C, which separates ⌺. The same holds if Ž . dim X s 2: take C to be the boundary of a 2-simplex. But under Ž . assumption b , this separation contradicts the earlier conclusion that the flow in S decreases area. QED Proof. The existence of ⌺ is proved as in the proof of Theorem 6.12.
Ä 4 As L x is almost surely a compact invariant set by the limit set theorem, k it almost surely lies in K, hence in ⌺. QED
The following form of Theorem 6.12 resembles a conservation law: 
